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Abstract 
The monitoring and control of any dynamic system 
depends crucially on the ability to reason about its 
current status and its future trajectory. In the case 
of a stochastic system, these tasks typically involve 
the use of a belief state-a probability distribution 
over the state of the process at a given point in time. 
Unfortunately, the state spaces of complex processes 
are very large, making an explicit representation of 
a belief state intractable. Even in dynamic Bayesian 
networks (DBNs), where the process itself can be 
represented compactly, the representation of the be­
lief state is intractable. We investigate the idea of 
maintaining a compact approximation to the true be­
lief state, and analyze the conditions under which 
the errors due to the approximations taken over the 
lifetime of the process do not accumulate to make 
our answers completely irrelevant. We show that the 
error in a belief state contracts exponentially as the 
process evolves. Thus, even with multiple approx­
imations, the error in our process remains bounded 
indefinitely. We show how the additional structure 
of a DBN can be used to design our approximation 
scheme, improving its performance significantly. We 
demonstrate the applicability of our ideas in the con­
text of a monitoring task, showing that orders of mag­
nitude faster inference can be achieved with only a 
small degradation in accuracy. 
1 Introduction 
The ability to model and reason about stochastic processes 
is fundamental to many applications [6, 8, 3, 14]. A number 
of formal models have been developed for describing situ­
ations of this type, including Hidden Markov Models [15], 
Kalman Filters [9], and Dynamic Bayesian Networks [4]. 
These very different models all share the same underlying 
Markov assumption, the fact that the future is conditionally 
independent of the past given the current state. Since the 
domain is stochastic and partially observable, the true state 
of the process is rarely known with certainty. However, 
most reasoning tasks can be performed by using a belief 
state, which is a probability distribution over the state of 
a system at a given time [1]. It follows from the Markov 
assumption that the belief state at time t completely cap­
tures all of our information about the past. In particular, it 
suffices both for predicting the probabilities of future tra­
jectories of the system, and for making optimal decisions 
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about our actions. 
Consider, for example, the task of monitoring an evolving 
system. Given a belief state at time t which summarizes 
all of our evidence so far, we can generate a belief state for 
timet+ 1 using a straightforward procedure: We propagate 
our current belief state through the state evolution model, 
resulting in a distribution over states at timet+ 1, and then 
condition that distribution on the observations obtained at 
time t + 1, getting our new belief state. 
The effectiveness of this procedure (as well as of many oth­
ers) depends crucially on the representation of the belief 
state. Certain types of systems, e.g., Gaussian processes, 
admit a compact representation of the belief state and an ef­
fective update process (via Kalman .filtering [9]). However, 
in other cases matters are not so simple. Consider, for exam­
ple, a stochastic system represented as a dynamic Bayesian 
network (DBN). A DBN, like a Bayesian network, allows a 
decomposed representation of the state via state variables, 
and a compact representation of the probabilistic model by 
utilizing conditional independence assumptions. Here, a 
belief state is a distribution over some subset of the state 
variables at time t. In general, not all of the variables at 
timet must participate in the belief state [3]; however, (at 
least) every variable whose value at time t directly affects 
its value at time t + 1 must be included. In large DBNs, 
the obvious representation of a belief state (as a flat distri­
bution over its state space) is therefore typically infeasible, 
particularly in time-critical applications. 
However, our experience with Bayesian networks has led 
us to the tacit belief that structure is usually synonymous 
with easy inference. Thus, we may expect that, here also, 
the structure of the model would support a decomposed 
representation of the distribution, and thereby much more 
effective inference. Unfortunately, this hope turns out to be 
unfounded. Consider the DBN of Figure 1 (a), and assume 
to begin with that the evidence variable did not exist. At 
the initial time slice, all of the variables start out being in­
dependent. Furthermore, there are only a few connections 
between one variable and another. Nevertheless, at time 3, 
all the variables have become fully correlated: one can see 
from the unrolled DBN of Figure l (b) that no conditional 
independence relation holds among any of them. Observ­
ing the evidence variable makes things even worse: i_n this 
case it takes only 2 time slices for all the state vartables 
to become fully correlated. In general, unless a process 
decomposes into completely independent subprocesses, the 
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Figure I: Example structured stochastic process: (a) two-time­
slice DBN; (b) unrolled BN for 3 time slices. 
belief state will become fully correlated very early in time. 
As any factored decomposition of a distribution rests on 
some form of conditional independence, no decomposition 
of this belief state is possible. This phenomenon is per­
haps the most serious impediment to applying probabilistic 
reasoning methods to dynamic systems. 
Related problems occur in other types of processes. For ex­
ample, in hybrid processes involving both continuous and 
discrete variables, we might wish to represent the belief 
state as a mixture of Gaussians. However, in most cases, 
the number of components in the mixture will grow expo­
nentially over time, making it impossible to represent or 
reason with an exact belief state. 
One approach to dealing with this problem is to restrict 
the complexity of our belief state representation, allowing 
inference algorithms to operate on it effectively. Thus, 
rather than using an exact belief state which is very complex, 
we use a compactly represented approximate belief state. 
For example, in the context of a DBN, we might choose 
to represent an approximate belief state using a factored 
representation. (See [ 12] for some discussion of possible 
belief state representations for DBNs.) In the context of a 
hybrid process, we might choose to restrict the number of 
components in our Gaussian mixture. 
This idea immediately suggests a new scheme for monitor­
ing a stochastic process: We first decide on some computa­
tionally tractable representation for an approximate belief 
state (e.g., one which decomposes into independent fac­
tors). Then we propagate the approximate belief state at 
time t through the transition model and condition it on our 
evidence at timet + I. In general, the resulting belief state 
for time t + I will not fall into the class which we have 
chosen to maintain. We therefore approximate it using one 
that does, and propagate further. 
This general strategy must face the risk that our repeated 
approximations cause errors to build up out of control over 
extended periods of time, either by accumulation due to the 
repeated approximations, or (worse) by spontaneous ampli­
fication due to some sort of instability. In this paper, we 
show that this problem does not occur: the mere stochas­
ticity of the process serves to attenuate the effects of errors 
over time, fast enough to prevent the accumulated error 
from growing unboundedly. More specifically, we have 
proved the important (and to our knowledge) new result 
that stochastic processes (under certain assumptions) are a 
contraction for KL-divergence [2]: propagation of two dis­
tributions through a stochastic transition model results in 
a constant factor reduction of the KL-divergence between 
them. We believe that this result will have significant ap-
plications in many other contexts. 
This result applies to any discrete stochastic process and 
any approximate representation of the belief state. How­
ever, we show that even stronger results can be obtained 
in the case of structured processes equipped with an ap­
proximation scheme that is tailored to the structure of the 
process. Specifically, we consider processes that are com­
posed of several weakly interacting subprocesses, and an 
approximation scheme that decomposes each belief state as 
a product of independent belief states over the individual 
processes. Under these assumptions, our contraction rate 
improves dramatically. We also show a strong connection 
between the amount of interaction among the subprocesses 
and the quality of our bounds, We provide empirical ev­
idence for the success of our approach on two practical 
DBNs, showing that, by exploiting structure, we can achieve 
orders of magnitude faster inference with only a tiny degra­
dation in accuracy. As we mentioned above, DBNs have 
been a counter-example to our intuition that structured rep­
resentations leads to effective inference. Our results are the 
first to show how, at least for approximate inference, we 
can exploit the structure of a DBN for computational gain. 
2 Basic framework 
Our focus in this paper is on discrete-time finite-state 
Markov processes. Such processes can be modeled explic­
itly, as a Hidden Markov Model or, if additional structure is 
present, more compactly as a Dynamic Bayesian Network. 
A discrete time Markov process evolves by moving from 
one state to the other at consecutive times points. We use 
s(t) with s(t) E s = { S]' ... , sn} to denote the state at 
timet. In the case of a DBN, S(t) may be described as an 
assignment of values to some set of state variables. The 
Markov assumption, inherent to all of the models we con­
sider, asserts that the present state of the system contains 
enough information to make its future independent from its 
past, i.e., that P(S(t+i) I s<o)' ... , s<t)] = P(S(t+I) I s(t)]. 
For simplicity, we also assume that the process is time­
invariant, i.e., that the probability with which we have a 
transition from some state s; at time t to another state Sj 
at time t + I does not depend on t. Thus, we obtain that 
the process can be described via a transition model T: 
T[s;""'sj] � P(s?+I) I s�t)], where we use s�t) to denote 
the event s< t) = s;. In the case of an HMM, T is of­
ten specified explicitly as an n x n matrix; for a DBN, T 
is described more compactly as a fragment of a Bayesian 
network (see Section 5.2). 
The Markov process is typically hidden, or partially ob­
servable, meaning that its state is not directly observable. 
Rather, we observe a response R(t) E R = {r1, ... , rm}; 
in the case of a DBN, R(t) can be an assignment to some 
set of observable random variables. The response depends 
stochastically and exclusively on the state S(t); i.e. , R(t) 
is conditionally independent of any s<t') and R(t') given 
S(t). Using r�t) to denote R(t) = rh, we obtain that the 
observability aspect of the process can be described via an 
observation modelO: O[s;�rh] � P(r�t) I s�t)]. 
The Markov assumption implies that all the historical in­
formation needed to monitor or predict the system's evo-
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lution is contained in (the available knowledge about) its 
present state. This knowledge can be summarized in a be­
lief state-a probability distribution over the possible states. 
We distinguish between the prior and the posterior belief 
state: 
Definition 1 The prior belief state at timet, denoted uC •t), 
is the distribution over the state at t given the response 
history up to but not including timet. Letting r��) denote 
the response observed at time k, 
c•tl[ ·l � P[ (t) I coJ ct-!Jl u s, - 8i rho ' ... , rht-1 · 
The posterior belief state at time t, denoted uCt•), is the 
distribution over the state at timet given the response history 
up to and including timet: 
uCt•l[s;] � P[s�t) I r��l, ... ,r�t� :),r�t')]. 0 
The monitoring task is defined as the task of maintaining 
a belief state as time advances and new responses are ob­
served. In principle, the procedure is quite straightforward. 
Assume we have a posterior belief state uCt•) at time t. 
Upon observing the response rh at timet+ 1, the new state 
distribution uCt+It) can be obtained via a two-stage compu­
tation, based on the two models T and 0. The prior belief 
state uC•t+I) for the next time slice is obtained by propa­
gating uCt•) through the stochastic transition model, while 
the posterior uCt+It) is obtained by conditioning uC •t+I) 
on the response rh observed at timet + 1: 
n 
i=l 
2::�1 uC•t+l)[sz] O[slc......,.rh] 
Abstractly, we view T[·] as a function mapping u(t•) to 
uC •t+I), and define Orh [·] as the function mapping uC •t+I) 
to u(t+l•) upon observing the response rh at timet+ 1. 
While exact monitoring is simple in principle, it can be 
quite costly. As we mentioned in the introduction, the 
belief state for a process represented compactly as a DBN 
is typically exponential in the number of state variables; 
it is therefore impractical in general even to feasibly store 
the belief state, far less to propagate it through the various 
update procedures described above. 
Thus, we are interested in utilizing compactly represented 
approximate belief states in our inference algorithm. The 
risks associated with this idea are clear: the errors induced 
by our approximations may accumulate to make the results 
of our inference completely irrelevant. As we show in the 
next two sections, the stochasticity of the process prevents 
this problem from occurring. 
3 Simple contraction 
Consider the exact and estimated belief states uC t•) and 
u(t•). Intuitively, as we propagate each of them through the 
transition model it "forgets" some of its information; and 
as the two distributions forget about their differences, they 
become closer to each other. As we will see in Section 5, 
in order for our errors to remain bounded, their effect needs 
to dampen exponentially quickly. That is, we need to show 
that T reduces the distance between two belief states uCt•) 
and uCt•) by a constant factor. 
This result is known for T if we use £2 norm (Eu­
clidean distance) as the distance between our distributions: 
II T[uCt•)]- T[u(t•)l l2:::; 1>-21· II q(tt)- u(t•) lh' where 
>.2 is the second largest eigenvalue ofT. Unfortunately, £2 
norm is inappropriate for our purposes. Recall that there 
are two main operations involved in updating a belief state: 
propagation through the transition model, and conditioning 
on an observation. Unfortunately, £2 norm behaves badly 
with respect to conditioning: II Orh [uC•t)]- Orh [uC•t)JII2 
can be arbitrarily larger than II uC•t)- uC•t) ll2- In fact, 
one can construct examples where the observation of any 
response rh will cause the £2 distance to grow. 
Thus, we must search for an alternative distance measure 
for which to try and prove our contraction result. The 
obvious candidate is relative entropy, or KL divergence, 
which quantifies the loss or inefficiency incurred by using 
distribution .,P when the true distribution is if> [2, p. l8]: 
Definition 2 If if> and t/J are two distributions over the same 
space Q, the relative entropy of if> to t/J is 
Relative entropy is, for a variety of reasons detailed in [2, 
ch.2], a very natural measure of discrepancy to use between 
a distribution and an approximation to it. Furthermore, and 
in contrast to £2, it behaves very reasonably with respect to 
conditioning: 
Factl For any t, Ep(t>[D[Orh[uC•t)JIIOrh[u(tt)]]] :=:; 
D[uC•t) II uC•t)], where p(t) = (uC•t) 0) is the prior on 
the response at time t. 
Unfortunately, we seem to have simply shifted the problem 
from one place to another. While relative entropy is better 
behaved with respect to 0, there is no known contraction re­
sult forT. Indeed, until now, the only related properties that 
seem to have been known [2, p.34] are that relative entropy 
never increases by transition through a stochastic process 
(i.e., that D[T[u(t•)JIIT[uCt•)]] :::; D[uCt•)II&Cttl]), and 
that it ultimately tends to zero for a very broad class of 
processes (i.e., D[Tk[uCt•)]IITk[uCt•)]] _,. 0 ask_,. oo 
when T is ergodic). Unfortunately, we need much stronger 
results if we wish to bound the accumulation of the error 
over time. One of the main contributions of this paper is 
the first proof (to our knowledge) that a stochastic transition 
contracts relative entropy at a geometric rate. 
We now prove that a stochastic process T does, indeed, lead 
to a contraction in the relative entropy distance. It will be 
useful later on (for the case of DBNs) to consider a some­
what more general setting, where the sets of states 'before' 
and 'after' the stochastic transition are not necessarily the 
same. Thus, let Q = {w1, ... ,wn} be our anterior state 
space, and Q' = { w�, ... , w�,} be our ulterior state space. 
Let Q be ann x n' stochastic matrix, representing a random 
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process from Q to Q'. Let cp and 1/J be two given anterior 
distributions over Q, and let cp' and 1/J' be the corresponding 
ulterior distributions induced over Q' by Q. 
Our goal is to measure the minimal extent to which the 
process Q causes the two distributions to become the same. 
In the worst case, there is no common starting point at all: 
all of the mass in one distribution cp is on some state w;, 
while all of the mass in the other distribution 1/J is on some 
other state w;2• However, the stochastic nature of the process 
causes each of them to place some weight on any posterior 
state wj: the probability cp'[wj] is Q[wj I w;,] while 1/J'(wj] 
is Q[wj I w;2]. Thus, while none of the probability mass of 
cp and 1/J was in agreement, cp' and 1/J' must agree on wj 
for a mass of min[Q[wj I w;,], Q[wj I w;2]]. Based on this 
insight, we have the following natural characterization of 
the mixing properties of our process: 
Definition 3 For a Markov process with stochastic transi­
tion model Q, the minimal mixing rate of Q is 
n' 
IQ � min;1,i2'I: min[Q[wj I w;,], Q[wj I W;2]]. D 
i=I 
We will show that stochastic propagation by Q is guaranteed 
to reduce relative entropy by a factor of I - IQ. The 
proof relies on the following lemma, which allows us to 
isolate the probability mass in the two distributions which 
is guaranteed to mix: 
Lemma 2 For any 1 :::; IQ and any given cp and 1/J, the 
matrix Q admits an additive contraction decomposition 
Q = Qr + Q"', where Qr and Q"' are non-negative ma-
trices such that, for all i, I:j � 1 QL = I· and for all j, 
2:::7=1 <,o[wi] Q[,j = 2:::7=1 1/J(wi] Qf,j. 
Intuitively, we have argued that, for at least a certain por­
tion of their probability mass, <p1 and 1/J' must agree. The 
matrix Qr captures that "portion" of the transition that uni­
fies the two. The two conditions state that this unification 
must happen with probability at least IQ, and that the two 
distributions must, indeed, agree on on that portion. 
Based on this lemma, our contraction result now follows 
easily. Essentially, the argument is based on a construction 
that makes explicit the different behavior of the process cor­
responding to the two parts of the contraction decomposi­
tion Qr, Q"'. As suggested on Figure 2, we split the process 
into two separate phases: in the first, the process "decides" 
whether to contract, and in the second the appropriate tran­
sition occurs. That is, we define a new intermediate state 
space nt, which contains a new distinguished contraction 
state c and otherwise is identical to Q. We separate out the 
cases in which the process is guaranteed to contract cp and 
1/J by having them correspond to an explicit transition to 
c. From c, the two processes behave identically, according 
to Qr, while from the remaining states in nt' they behave 
according to Q"'. We are now in a position to prove our 
contraction theorem: 
Theorem 3 For Q, cp, 1/J, cp', 1/J' as above: 
D(cp'II'I/J']:::; (1 - �(Q)D(cpii'I/JJ. 
n n· 
(a) 
Figure 2: Decomposition used in Theorem 3: (a) generic Markov 
transition process; (b) two-stage process equivalent to it for cp and 
TjJ. Here, arrows denote stochastic transitions between states. 
Proof Fix cp and 1/J, and define a new two-phase process 
with one Markovian transition wr from Q to Qt and an­
other W"' from nt to Q', where nt = {u!, ... , Un ,  c} is a 
new state set (see Figure 2). Intuitively, the state u; corre­
sponds to w; while the state c corresponds to the state ob­
tained if the process contracts. The process wr transitions 
to the contraction state with probability 1 and preserves its 
state with probability 1 - 1; i.e., wr(w; "'-> c) = 1 while 
wr(w; "'-> u;] = 1 - 1· The process W"' behaves like Q"' 
from the states u;; from c, it duplicates the aggregate be­
havior of cp on Qr, i.e., W"'[ u; "'-" wj] = Qt,j / ( 1 -1) while 
W"'[c,wj] = Li cp[wi] QLh· 
It is easy to show that the decomposed process is equivalent 
to the original process Q for cp and 1/J (this will not be the 
case for other distributions). To showthatD(cp'll 1/J'] :::; ( 1-
I)D(cp II 1/J], we note thatD(cpt II 1/Jt] = (1-I)D(cp II 1/J]. As 
W"' is Markovian, we also have D(cp'll 1/J'] :::; D(cpt II 1/J t], 
hence the claim. I 
4 Compound processes 
Our results so far apply to any discrete state Markovian pro­
cess. However, their potential impact is greatest in cases 
where an explicit representation of the belief state is infea­
sible. DBNs, which allow very complex processes to be 
specified compactly, often fall into this category. How well 
do our results apply to DBNs? Unfortunately, the answer 
is somewhat discouraging, even for very highly structured 
DBNs. As an extreme example, imagine a process com­
posed of N binary variables evolving independently, flip­
ping their value each time slice with probability 8. Each 
variable, viewed as a separate Markov process, has a mix­
ing rate of 28. Thus, one may expect the mixing rate of 
the process as a whole to be as good; indeed, since all 
of the processes are independent, we could hardly expect 
otherwise. 
However Theorem 3 tells a different story: computing 1 for 
the transition matrix of the compound process as a whole, 
one gets a discouragingly small value which is :::; ( 48)NI2. 
Is our definition of the mixing rate simply too pessimistic? 
Unfortunately not. The fallacy is in our assumption that 
local mixing properties would automatically carry over to 
the compound process. Each subprocess is rapidly mixing 
for belief states over its own variable only. If the belief 
state of the compound process involves dependencies be­
tween variables belonging to different subprocesses, then 
our contraction rate can, indeed, be as bad as our predic­
tion. Assume, for example, that the true distribution cp 
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gives probability 1 to the state (i.e., assignment of values 
to variables) {0, ... , 0) while the approximate distribution 1/J 
gives probability p to that state and 1 - p to its opposite 
{ 1, ... , 1). We can view the state space as a hypercube, and 
each of these distributions as a mass assignment to vertices 
of the hypercube. A single step through the transition ma­
trix "diffuses" the mass of the two distributions randomly 
around their starting points. However, the probability that 
the diffusion process around one point reaches the other is 
exponentially low, since all bits have to flip in one or the 
other of the two distributions. 
One approach to improving our results for decomposed pro­
cesses is to make some additional assumptions about the 
structure of the belief state distributions, e.g., that they de­
compose. Clearly, such an assumption would be unreason­
able for the true belief state, as its lack of decomposability 
was the basis for our entire paper. Somewhat surprisingly, 
it suffices to make a decomposability assumption only for 
the approximate belief state. That is, we can show that if 
the process decomposes well, and the estimated belief state 
decomposes in a way that matches the structure of the pro­
cess, then we get significantly better bounds on the error 
contraction coefficient, regardless of the true belief state. 
Thus, as far as error contraction goes, the properties of the 
true belief state are not crucial: only the approximate be­
lief state and the process itself. This is very fortunate, as 
it is feasible to enforce decomposability properties on the 
approximate belief state, whereas we have no control over 
the true belief state. 
Formally, it is most convenient to describe our results in 
the framework of factored HMMs [ 17]; in the next section, 
we discuss how they can be applied to dynamic Bayesian 
networks. We assume that our system is composed of sev­
eral subprocesses 7i. Each subprocess has a state with a 
Markovian evolution model. The state of subprocess l at 
timet is written s?). The evolution model 7i is a stochastic 
mapping from the states of some set of processes at timet to 
the state of process l at timet + 1. We say that subprocess l 
depends on subprocess l' if7i depends on the value of s�t). 
Our model also allows a set of response variables at each 
time t, which can depend arbitrarily on the states of the 
processes at timet; however, as we are interested primarily 
in the contraction properties of our system, the properties of 
the response variables are irrelevant to our current analysis. 
We begin by considering the simple case where our subpro­
cesses are completely independent, i.e., where subprocess 
l depends only on subprocess l. We also assume that our 
approximate belief state decomposes along the same lines. 
Clearly, this case is not interesting in itself: if our subpro­
cesses are really independent, our belief state would never 
become correlated in the first place, and we would not need 
to approximate it. However, this analysis lays the founda­
tion for the general case described below. 
Theorem 4 Let 'I-t, ... , TL be L independent subprocesses, 
let'"'(l be the mixing rate of7;, andlet1 = minrn. Let <p and 
t/J be distributions over sit)' ... ' sr)' and assume that the 
sft) are marginally independent in t/J. Then D[<p'jj t/J') :S 
(1-!)D[<pllt/JJ. 
Thus, if we have a set of independent subprocesses, each 
of which contracts, and our approximate belief state de-
composes along the same lines as the process, then the 
contraction of the process as a whole is no worse than the 
contraction of the individual subprocesses. Since each sub­
process involves a much smaller number of states, its transi­
tion probabilities are likely to be reasonably large (assuming 
it is stochastic enough). This analysis usually results in a 
much better mixing rate. 
Now consider the more general case where the processes 
interact. Assume that subprocess l depends on subprocesses 
l1, ... , lf<. Then, 7i defines a probability P(Sr I Sr1, • • •  , Srk ). 
This transition probability can be defined as a transition 
matrix, but one whose anterior and ulterior state spaces can 
be different. Luckily, in Section 3, we allowed for exactly 
this possibility, so that the mixing rate of 7i is well-defined. 
Let 11 be the mixing rate of 7i, and let 1 = minm. If 
our approximate belief state, as before, respects the process 
structure, then we can place a bound on the mixing rate of 
the entire process. This bound depends both on 1 and on the 
process structure, and is given by the following theorem. 
Theorem 5 Consider a system consisting of L subpro­
cesses 'I-t, ... , TL, and assume that each subprocess depends 
on at most r others; each subprocess influences at most 
q others; and each 7i has minimum mixing rate 11 :::: 'Y· 
Let <p and t/J be distributions over s}t), ... , sit), where the 
s?) are independent in t/J. Then: Then D[<p'll t/J'J ::; 
(1-!*)D[<pllt/JJ, where1* = (!/r)1. 
Proof idea We illustrate the basic construction for a 
simple example; generalization to arbitrary structures is 
straightforward. Consider two processes Tx and Ty as 
above, and assume that Ty depends on Tx. Our basic con­
struction follows the lines of the proof of Theorem 3: we 
split the transition of each process into two phases where the 
first chooses whether or not to contract and the second con­
cludes the transition in a way that depends on whether the 
process has contracted. Note, however, that the variable X 
plays a role both in Tx and in Ty, and that the transitions of 
these two subprocesses are conditionally independent given 
X. Thus, X cannot make a single decision to contract and 
apply it in the context of both processes. We therefore in-
troduce two separate intermediate variables for Tx, X� 
and X�, where the first decides whether X contracts in the 
context of Tx and the second whether it contracts in the 
context of Ty. Our decomposition is as follows: ')�:····· ·········· �,[ � ' 
'·.� )  ... ········ . . .  '· .: �..: 
··-
•
•
•
•••
••• 
•
•••
••
• •
• •
••
• •
• •
••
•• 
•
• 
.
•
• • •  (?" '=---=::.::-:.-:.7.7'.":'·':".;-.-:-.� 
•......
. 
-
·
·· · 
t t+l t t+l 
Our transitions for the partitioned model are defined so as to 
make sure that the parts of the two-phase processes marked 
with the dotted lines induce the same behavior as their cor­
responding one-phase processes,for the distributions <p[X] 
and t/J[X]. (As in the proof of Theorem 3, this equivalence 
only holds for this pair of distributions.) The construction 
is essentially identical to that of Theorem 3, except that that 
the transition from X to the distinguished contraction state 
c§ of X� is taken with some probability .X1 to be specified 
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below. 
To get equivalence for the Ty process, we must deal with 
a slight subtlety: The transition from X�, yt to Y' must 
behave as if the first phase contracted if either of the two 
antecendents X�, yt is in the contraction state. (There is 
no choice, because if even one is in the contraction state, 
the process no longer has enough information to transition 
according to Q� .) Thus, if X ---> X� contracts with 
probability Az andY ---> yt with probability AJ, the process 
as a whole contracts with probability 1 - (I - Az)(I -
A3). Therefore, in order for us to be able to construct a 
contraction decomposition Q�, Q�, we must select AJ , Az, A3 so as to satisfy AJ ::; IQx and 1- (I- Az)(I- AJ)::; 
IQy. Assuming that IQx = IQy = 1, we have that 
Az = A3 = I - VJ=7" is one legitimate selection; observe 
that I - .;r=-7 2: 1/2. 
To analyze the actual contraction rate of the process as a 
whole, we first analyze the contraction from the initial vari-
ables X, Y to the intermediate variables X�, X�, Y t; the 
contraction for the two phases is no smaller. Our analy­
sis here uses a somewhat different process structure-the 
one shown using the dashed lines-than the one used to 
show the correctness of the partition. These processes-
Wx from X to {X�, X�} and Wy from Y to yt_are 
independent (by design). Furthermore, we have assumed 
that X andY are independent in 1/J. Thus, the conditions of 
Theorem 4 apply1 and the contraction of the process from 
X, Y to X�, X�, yt is the minimum of the contraction of 
Wx and of Wy. Straightforwardly, the contraction of Wy 
is AJ. However, Wx contracts-loses all information about 
its original state-only when both X x and X y enter their 
contraction state. These events are independent, hence the 
probability that they both occur is the product AJAz. 
In general, if a subprocess Q1 has a contraction ratio 11 
and depends on r1 subprocesses, we have to choose the 
contraction factor A for each influencing process (assum­
ing for simplicity that all are chosen to be equal) to be 
1- \YI -11 2: 1/r, resulting in a linear reduction in the 
contraction rate. On the other hand, each influence of a sub­
process Ql on another subprocess involves the construction 
of another intermediate variable, each of which contracts 
independently. The total contraction of Wx, is the prod­
uct of the individual contractions, which is 1* = A q, an 
exponential reduction. Putting it all together, the overall 
contraction rate admits the lower bound 1* = ( 1/ r )q. I 
We see that interconnectivity between the processes costs 
us in terms of our contraction ratio. The cost of "incom­
ing" connectivity is a linear reduction in the contraction rate 
whereas the cost of "outgoing" connectivity is exponential. 
Intuitively, this phenomenon makes sense: if a process in­
fluences many others, it is much less likely that its value 
will be lost via contraction. 
1The theorem was stated for processes where the anterior and 
ulterior state space is identical, but the same proof applies to the 
more general case. 
5 Efficient monitoring 
As we suggested throughout the paper, one of the main 
applications of our results is to the task of monitoring a 
complex process. As we mentioned, the exact monitoring 
task is often intractable, requiring that we maintain a very 
large belief state. We proposed an alternative approach, 
where we maintain instead an approximate belief state. As 
we now show, our contraction results allow us to bound the 
cumulative error arising from such an approximate monitor­
ing process. We also investigate one particular application 
of this approach, in the contex of DBNs. 
5.1 Approximate monitoring 
Recall the notation of Section 2 about belief states, and 
denote by iT(t) our compactly represented approximate be­
lief state at time t. The choice of compact representa­
tion depends on the process. If, for example, our pro­
cess is composed of some number of weakly interacting 
subprocesses-e.g., several cars on a freeway-it may be 
reasonable to represent our belief state at a given time using 
our marginal beliefs about its parts (e.g., individual vehi­
cles). In a hybrid process, as we said, we may want to use 
a fixed-size mixture of Gaussians. 
The approximate belief state 17(t) is updated using the same 
process as u(t•): we propagate it through the transition 
model, obtaining &( •t+l), and condition on the current 
response, obtaining o-(t+l•). However, o-(t+J.) does not 
usually fall into the same family of compactly-represented 
distributions to which we chose to restrict our belief states. 
In order to maintain the feasibility of our update process, we 
must approximate o-(t+l•), typically by finding a "nearby" 
distribution that admits a compact representation; the result 
is our new approximate belief state u(t+l). In our free­
way domain, for example, we may compute our new beliefs 
about the state of each vehicle by projecting o-(t+l•), and 
use the cross product of these individual belief states as 
our approximation; the resulting distribution is the closest 
(in terms of relative-entropy) to o-(t+l•). In our continuous 
process, we could project back into our space of allowable 
belief states by approximating the distribution using a fixed 
number of Gaussians. 
We begin by analyzing the error resulting from this type 
of strategy, i.e., the distance between the true posterior 
belief state u(t+h) and our approximation to it u(t+l). 
Intuitively, this error results from two sources: the "old" 
error which we "inherited" from the previous approxima­
tion iT(t), and the "new" error derived from approximating 
o-(t+l•) using u(t+l). Suppose that each approximation in­
troduces an error of c, increasing the distance between the 
exact belief state and our approximation to it. However, 
the contraction resulting from the state transitions serves 
to drive them closer to each other, reducing the effect of 
old errors by a factor of f. The various observations move 
the two even closer to each other on expectation (averaged 
over the different possible responses). Therefore, the ex­
pected error accumulated up to time t would behave as 
c + ( I - I) c + ... + ( I - I) t- I c ::; c Li ( I - I) i = c h. 
To formalize this result, we first need to quantify the error 
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resulting from our approximation. Our new approximate 
belief state a-Ct) is an approximation to uCt•). Most obvi­
ously, we would define the error of the approximation as the 
relative entropy distance between them-D(u(t•) II a-Ct)]. 
However, our error is measured relative to uCt•) and not 
to u(t•). Therefore, we use the following definition: 
Definition 4 We say that an approximation a-Ct) of uCt•) 
incurs error c: relative to u(a) if 
D(u(t•) II a-Ct)]- D[u(t.) II u(t•)] � c. D 
Our last theorem now follows easily by induction on t: 
Theorem 6 Let T be a stochastic process whose mixing 
rate is /, assume that we have an approximation scheme 
that, at each phase t, incurs error c: relative to uCt•). Then 
for any t, we have: 
Ep(I, ... ,t) [D(u(a) II a-Ct)]] � c:!J, 
where the expectation is taken over the possible response 
sequences rh1, ••• , rh., with the probability ascribed to them 
by the process T. 
Of course, it is not trivial to show that a particular ap­
proximation scheme will satisfy the accuracy require­
ment of c:, essentially because its definition involves the 
true belief uCt•), which is usually not known. Nev­
ertheless, a sufficient condition for this requirement is 
max;ln [u(t•)[s;]]/if(t)[s;] � c:; and the left-hand side 
quantity-the maximum log relative error caused by the 
approximation scheme at time t-is often easy to assess for 
a given approximation step. 
Let us understand the guarantees provided by this theorem. 
First, the bound involves relative entropy between the two 
entire belief states. In certain applications, we may be in­
terested in errors for individual variables or for subsets of 
variables. Fortunately, any bound on the entire distribution 
immediately carries over to any projection onto a subset 
of variables [2]. Furthermore, we note that bounds on rel­
ative entropy immediately imply bounds on the L, error, 
as I IIP -1/llh � (2ln2D[�PII1/1])112. Second, note that the 
bounds are on the expected error; the error for specific se­
quences of evidence are much weaker. In particular, the 
error after a very unlikely sequence of evidence might be 
quite large. Fortunately, our contraction result holds for 
arbitrary distributions, no matter how far apart. Thus, even 
if momentarily uCt•) and a-(t) are very different, the con­
traction property will reduce this error exponentially. 
5.2 Monitoring in DBNs 
We now consider a specific application of this general ap­
proach. We consider a process described as a DBN, and a 
factored belief state representation (where certain subsets 
of variables are forced to be independent). In this case, the 
process is specified in terms of an ordered set of state vari­
ables X1, •.. , Xn. The probability model of a DBN is typ­
ically described using a 2-TBN (a two time-slice temporal 
Bayesian network), as shown in Figure 1. The 2-TBN asso­
ciates each variable with a conditional probability distribu-
tion P[Xkt+i) I Parents(Xkt+l))], where Parents(Xkt+')) 
can contain any variable at time t and such variables at 
time t + 1 that preceed xk in the total ordering. This 
model represents the conditional distribution over the state 
at timet+ 1 given the variables at timet. Let C be the set 
{X: X(t) E UkParents(Xkt+l))}. 
To capture the idea of a subprocess, we partition the set C 
into disjoint subsets X 1, .•. , XL. Our partition must satisfy 
the requirement that no X 1 may be affected by another 
X, within the same time slice; i.e., if X E X1, then X(t+l) 
cannot have as an ancestor a variable y(t+l) for Y E X1, # X I· Note that a time slice may also contain non-persistent 
variables, e.g., sensor readings; but since none of them may 
ever be an ancestor of a canonical variable, we allow them to 
depend on any persistent variable in their time slice. Since 
the various clusters X 1 correspond to our subprocesses from 
Theorem 5, we shall maintain an approximate belief state 
in which the X 1 are independent, as prescribed. 
The approximate monitoring procedure for DBNs follows 
the same lines as the general procedure described in Sec­
tion 2: At each point in time, we have an approximate belief 
state a-C 1), in which the X 1 are all independent. We propa­
gate a-(t) through the transition model, and then condition 
the result on our observations at time t + 1. We then compute 
a-Ct+ I ) by projecting u(t+i•) onto each X1; i.e., we define 
a-(t+l)[X1] = &(t+l•)[X1], and the entire distribution as a 
product of these factors. 
In the case of DBNs, we can actually accomplish this up­
date procedure quite efficiently. We first generate a clique 
tree [13] in which, for every /, some clique contains X�t) 
and some clique contains X �t+l). A standard clique tree 
propagation algorithm can then be used to compute the pos­
terior distribution over every clique. Once that is done, the 
distribution over x �t+l) is easily extracted from the appro­
priate clique. Further savings can be obtained if we assume 
a stationary DBN and a static approximation scheme. 
In order to apply this generic procedure to a particular prob­
lem, we must define a partition of the canonical variables, 
i.e., choose a partition of the process into subprocesses. Our 
analysis in the previous sections can be used to evaluate the 
alternatives. The tradeoffs, however, are subtle: Subpro­
cesses with a small number of state variables allow more 
efficient inference. They also have a smaller transition ma­
trix and therefore their mixing rate is likely to be better. On 
the other hand, our subprocesses need to be large enough so 
that there are no edges between subprocesses within a sin­
gle time slice. Furthermore, making our subprocesses too 
small increases the error incurred by the approximation of 
assuming them to be independent. Specifically, if we have 
two (sets of) variables that are highly correlated, splitting 
them into two separate subprocesses is not a good idea. Our 
experimental results illustrate these tradeoffs. 
5.3 Experimental results 
We validated this algorithm in the context of two real-life 
DBNs: the WATER network [8], used for monitoring the 
biological processes of a water purification plant; and the 
BAT network [6], used for monitoring freeway traffic (see 
Figure 3). We added a few evidence nodes to WATER, which 
did not have any; these duplicate a few of the state variables 
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Figure 3: The canonical fonn 2-TBNs for the DBNs used in our experiments: (a) the BAT network; (b) the WATER network. The dotted 
lines indicate some of the clusterings used in our approximations. 
with added noise. The experimentation methodology is as 
follows: starting from the same initial prior (the uniform 
prior), we monitor the process evolution using our approxi­
mate method with some fixed decomposition, and compare 
it at every t to the exact inference, which is emulated by 
using our algorithm with the trivial partition (all canonical 
state variables in a single cluster). Observations are simu­
lated by sampling the evidence variables according to the 
exact distribution. 
Figure 4(a) shows the evolution of relative entropy for the 
BAT network on a typical run, using the shadowed nodes as 
evidence nodes. In this network, the belief state consists 
of 10 variables roughly partitioned in two weakly interact­
ing groups of 5: we choose this "5+5" partition for our 
approximation scheme. On an UltraSparc 2, the approxi­
mate monitoring took about 0.11 seconds per time slice, as 
compared to 1.72 for the exact inference, yielding a 15-fold 
speedup. In terms of accuracy, the error averages at 0.0007, 
remaining very low most of the time with, as we would ex­
pect, a few sparsely distributed spikes to somewhat larger 
values, peaking at 0.065. We also note that it does not 
appear to grow over the length of the run, as predicted by 
our analysis. Since in practical applications the emphasis is 
often on a few selected variables, we also computed the L1 
errors for the beliefs over the two variables 'LateralAction' 
and 'ForwardAction' (i.e., the belief states marginalized 
over each of them). Their qualitative pattern was roughly 
similar to Figure 4(a), they respectively averaged 0.00013 
and 0.0019, and remained bounded by 0.02 and 0.07 over 
the 1000-step run of our experiment. 
Similar tests were conducted on the WATER network shown 
on Figure 3(b), and using a decomposed belief over the 3 
clusters A-B, C-D-E-F, and G-H. Over a run of length 3000, 
the error remained bounded by 0.06 with the exception 
of one outlier to 0.14, and averaged 0.006 over that run. 
Running times were 0.19 sec/slice for the approximation, 
vs. 6.02 sec/slice for the reference (a 31-fold speedup). 
To investigate the effect of our approximate belief state rep­
resentation, we ran the following experiment on three dif­
ferent projections: the "5+5" clustering already introduced, 
a "3+2+4+ 1" clustering obtained by further breaking down 
the 5-clusters (see Figure 3(a)), and a "3+3+4" clustering 
chosen irrespectively of the network topology. 2 
First, we used our theoretical tools to predict how well each 
of these would perform, compared with each other. The two 
determining factors here are the stepwise approximation er­
ror c and the overall mixing rate bounded by 1* . The former 
is directly linked to the expressiveness of the approxima­
tion; so according to this criterion we have in decreasing 
order of quality: "5+5" � "3+3+4"!:: "3+2+4+1". To as­
sess the mixing rates, we computed the vector f of mixing 
rates for all the clusters, and used it together with the topo­
logical quantities q and r to calculate 1* from Theorem 5. 
For the "5+5" clustering, this gave f = (0.00040, 0.0081), 
r = 2,q = 2,and thus")'* = (/min/r)q = 4x10-8. For the 
"3+2+4+ 1" clustering, f = (0.00077, 0.080, 0.0081, 0.96), 
r = 3, q = 2, so/* = 7 X w-8• For the "3+3+4" clus­
tering, f = (0.0022, 0.020, 0.0034), r = 3, q = 3, so 
")'* = 4 X w-10. For this criterion, we get "3+2+4+1" � 
"5+5" � "3+3+4": the latter is heavily penalized by the 
higher inter-connectivity of its clusters. 
The second step was to compare this with the actual mon­
itoring accuracy of our algorithm in each case. The results 
are shown in Figure 4(b) (averaged over 8 different runs and 
plotted on logarithmic scale). The "5+5" clustering (lower 
curve) has an average error of 0.0006, its error is always 
lower than the "3+2+4+1" clustering (medium curve) for 
which the error averages 0.015. Both are clearly superior to 
the"3+3+4" clustering, for which the average error reaches 
0.13.3 We observe that the errors obtained in practice is 
significantly lower than that predicted by the theoretical 
analysis. However, qualitatively, the behaviour of the dif­
ferent clusterings is consistent with the predictions of the 
theory. In particular, the quality of a clustering is very 
sensitive to its topology, as expected. 
Interestingly, the accuracy can be further improved by us­
ing conditionally independent approximations. In the WA­
TER network, for example, using a belief state decomposed 
into the overlapping clusters A-B-C-D-E, C-D-E-F-G, G-H 
yields, for the same sequence of observations as above, an 
2Strictly speaking, the "3+2+4+1" and "3+3+4" clusterings 
contain clusters that are not subprocesses according to our defi­
nition, as there are edges between clusters within the same time 
slice. However, it is impossible to find smaller clusterings in the 
BAT network that satisfy this restriction, and the empirical results 
still serve to illustrate the main points. 
3The speedups relative to exact inference were respectively 15, 
20, 20 for the "5+5", "3+2+4+ 1 ", "3+3+4" clusterings. 
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Figure 4: Experimental results: (a) relative entropy error for a typical run using the BAT network; (b) comparison of relative entropy 
error for three different approximate belief state representations (BAT network, curves averaged over 8 runs). 
average error of just 0.0015. Also, the error now remains 
bounded by 0.018 throughout, reducing the maximum er­
ror by a factor of 8. Approximate inference here took 0.47 
sec/slice, a 13-fold speedup over exact inference. 
We also tested the effect of evidence on the quality of 
our approximation. Without evidence, the error curve is 
very smooth, and converges relatively soon to a constant 
error, corresponding to the error between the correct sta­
tionary distribution of the process and our approximation 
to it. With evidence, the error curve has a much higher 
variance, but its average is typically much lower, indicat­
ing that evidence further boosts contraction (as opposed to 
merely being harmless). The effect of evidence was more 
beneficial with better clusterings. 
6 Conclusion and extensions 
We investigated the effect of approximate inference in a 
stochastic process. We showed that the stochastic nature of 
the process tends to make errors resulting from an approxi­
mation disappear rapidly as the process continues to evolve. 
Our analysis relies on a novel and important theorem prov­
ing a contraction result for relative entropy over stochastic 
processes. We also provided a more refined analysis for 
processes composed of weakly interacting subprocesses. 
We applied the idea of approximate inference to the mon­
itoring task. Exact inference for this task is infeasible in 
complex stochastic processes with a large number of states. 
Even if the process is highly structured, exact inference 
(e.g., [11]) is forced into intractability by the full correla­
tion of the belief state that invariably occurs. We propose 
an approach whereby the algorithm maintains an approxi­
mate belief state with compact representation. This belief 
state is propagated forward from one time slice to the next, 
and the result is approximated so as to maintain a compact 
representation. Our analysis guarantees that the errors from 
our approximations do not accumulate. 
This approach provides a general framework for approxi­
mate inference in stochastic processes. We also presented 
one instantiation of this general framework to the class of 
structured processes composed of weakly interacting sub­
processes. For this case, we provide a more refined analysis 
which results in significantly lower error bounds. We also 
presented experimental results showing that our approach 
works extremely well for real-life processes. Indeed, we 
get order of magnitude savings even for small processes, at 
the cost of a a very low error in our approximation. For 
larger processes, we expect the savings to be much greater. 
Both our theoretical and our empirical results clearly show 
that our ability to execute accurate effective inference for a 
stochastic process depends heavily on its structure. Thus, 
our result is the first to show how the structure of a stochastic 
process can be exploited for inference. 
There has been fairly little work on approximate inference in 
complex temporal models. 4 The early work of [ 14] consid­
ers a simple approach of using domain knowledge to simply 
eliminate some of the variables from each time slice. The 
random sampling approach of [ 1 0] can also be viewed as 
maintaining an approximate belief state, albeit one repre­
sented very naively as a set of weighted samples. The recent 
work of [12] extends this idea, using the random samples 
at each time slice as data in order to learn an approximate 
belief state. Both of these ideas can be viewed as falling 
into the framework described in this paper. However, nei­
ther contains any analysis nor an explicit connection to the 
structure of the process. 
The recent work of [7] and [16] utilize mean field approxi­
mation in the context of various types of structured HMMs. 
Of these approaches, [7] is the closest to our work (to the 
part of it dealing with structured processes). In their ap­
proach, the compound process is approximated as being 
composed of independent subprocesses, whose parameters 
are chosen in a way that depends on the evidence. This 
approach differs from ours in several ways. First, it applies 
only to situations where the subprocesses are, in fact, inde­
pendent, and only become correlated due to observations. 
Our work applies to much richer models of partially de­
composed systems. Second, their approximation scheme is 
based on making the subprocesses independent throughout 
their length, whereas our approach accounts for the cor­
relations between the subprocesses at each time slice, and 
then marginalizes them out. Finally, their analysis proves 
that their approximation is the closest possible to the true 
distribution among the class of distributions represented by 
independent processes; our analysis, by contrast, provides 
explicit bounds (in expectation) on the total error. 
4Some approximate inference algorithms for nontemporal 
Bayesian networks can also be applied to this task. Specifically, 
the mini-bucket approach of [5] is somewhat related to ours, as 
it also uses a (different) form of factoring decomposition during 
the course of inference. However, none of the potentially relevant 
algorithms are associated with any performance guarantees on the 
error of approximation over time. 
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One important direction in which our results can be ex­
tended relates to different representations of the belief state 
and of the process. Our current analysis requires that the 
belief state representation make the states of the subpro­
cesses completely independent. Clearly, in many situations 
a more refined belief state representation is more appro­
priate. For example, as our experiments show, it can be 
very beneficial to make the states of two processes in our 
approximate belief state conditionally independent given a 
third; we would like to derive the formal conditions under 
which this is indeed an advantage. The results of [12] 
also demonstrate that other representations of a belief state 
might be useful, specifically ones that allow some context­
sensitivity of the structure of the distribution. They also 
show that it is beneficial to allow the structure of the belief 
state representation to vary over time, thus making it more 
appropriate to the specific properties of the current belief 
state. In general, our basic contraction result applies to any 
approximation scheme for belief state representation; we 
intend to experiment with different alternatives and evalu­
ate their contraction properties. Finally, we would like to 
apply our analysis to other types of processes requiring a 
compact representation of the belief state, e.g., processes 
with a continuous state space. 
Another priority is to improve our analysis of the effect of 
evidence. Our current results only show that the evidence 
does not hurt too much. Our experiments, however, show 
(as we would expect) that the evidence can significantly 
reduce the overall error of our approximation. 
There are many other tasks to which our techniques can 
be applied. For example, our analysis applies as is to the 
task of predicting the future evolution of the system. It 
also applies to tasks where the transition model depends on 
some action taken by an agent. Our contraction analysis 
is done on a phase-by-phase basis, and therefore does not 
require that the transition model be the same at each time 
slice. Thus, so long as the transition associated with each 
action is sufficiently stochastic, we can use our technique to 
predict the effects of a plan or a policy. A more speculative 
idea is to the task of constructing policies for POMDPs; 
there, a policy is a mapping from belief states to actions. 
Perhaps our more compact belief state representation will 
turn out to be a better basis for representing a policy. 
We hope to generalize our contraction result to the case of 
reasoning backwards in time, allowing us to apply approxi­
mate inference to the task of computing our beliefs about a 
time slice given both past and future evidence. This infer­
ence task is the crucial component in algorithms that learn 
probabilistic models of stochastic processes from data. The 
learning process requires many iterations of this inference 
task, so that any improvement in efficiency could have ma­
jor impact. Furthermore, by showing that the influence of 
approximations in the future cannot significantly affect our 
beliefs about the past, we could obtain theoretical support 
for the simple and natural algorithm that computes beliefs 
about a time slice from a fairly small window on both sides. 
The applications of this idea to online learning are clear. 
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